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Inequality and Social Discounting
Emmanuel Farhi
Harvard University
Iva ´n Werning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
We explore steady-state inequality in an intergenerational model with
altruistically linked individualswhoexperienceprivatelyobservedtaste
shocks. When the welfare function depends only on the initial gen-
eration, efﬁciency requires immiseration: inequality grows without
bound and everyone’s consumption converges to zero. We study other
efﬁcient allocations in which the welfare function values future gen-
erations directly, placing a positive but vanishing weight on their wel-
fare. The social discount factor is then higher than the private one,
and for any such difference we ﬁnd that consumption exhibits mean
reversion and that a steady-state, cross-sectional distribution for con-
sumption and welfare exists, with no one trapped at misery.
I. Introduction
Societies inevitably choose the inheritability of welfare. Some balance
between equality of opportunity for newborns and incentives for altru-
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istic parents is struck. In this paper, we explore how this balancing act
plays out to determine long-run inequality.
An important backdrop to this question is provided by Atkeson and
Lucas (1992). They study a model populated by inﬁnitely lived agents
subject to idiosyncratic shocks that are private information. They reach
an extreme conclusion by proving an immiseration result: consumption
and welfare inequality should be perfectly inheritable and rise steadily
without bound, with everyone converging to absolute misery and a van-
ishing lucky fraction to bliss.
1 We depart minimally from this framework
by adopting the same positive economic model, but using a slightly
different normative criterion. In a generational context, efﬁcient allo-
cations for inﬁnitely lived agents characterize the instance in which
future generations are not considered directly, but only indirectly through
the altruism of earlier ones. On the opposite side of the spectrum,
Phelan (2006) proposes a social planner with equal weights on all gen-
erations that avoids the immiseration result because any allocation that
leads everyone to misery actually minimizes the welfare criterion. Our
interest here is in exploring a large class of Pareto-efﬁcient allocations
that also value future generations, but not equally. We place a positive
and vanishing Pareto weight on the expected welfare of future gener-
ations, which allows us to remain arbitrarily close to Atkeson-Lucas. As
this weight varies, we trace the Pareto frontier between Atkeson-Lucas
and Phelan.
2
Our welfare criterion captures the idea that it is desirable to insure
the unborn against the luck of their ancestors or, equivalently, insure
the risk of which family they are born into—arguably, the biggest risk
in life. Formally, we show that it is equivalent to a social discount factor
that is higher than the private one. This relatively small change relative
to Atkeson-Lucas produces a drastically different result: long-run in-
equality remains bounded in the sense that a steady-state, cross-sectional
distribution exists for consumption and welfare. At the steady state, there
is social mobility and welfare remains above an endogenous lower
bound, which is strictly better than misery. This outcome holds however
small the difference between social and private discounting.
Our positive economy is identical to Atkeson-Lucas’s taste-shock setup.
1 This immiseration result is robust; it obtains invariably in partial equilibrium (Green
1987; Thomas and Worrall 1990), in general equilibrium (Atkeson and Lucas 1992), and
across environments with moral hazard regarding work effort or with private information
regarding preferences or productivity (Aiyagari and Alvarez 1995), and it requires very
weak assumptions on preferences (Phelan 1998).
2 To make the notion more familiar, note that in overlapping-generation modelswithout
altruistic links, all market equilibria that are Pareto efﬁcient place positive, direct weight
on future generations. Bernheim (1989) pointed out that in extensions of these models
that incorporate altruism, many Pareto-efﬁcient allocations are not attainable by the
market.inequality and social discounting 367
Each generation is composed of a continuum of individuals who live
for one period and are altruistic toward a single descendant. There is
a constant aggregate endowment of the only consumption good in each
period. Individuals are ex ante identical but experience idiosyncratic
shocks to preferences that are privately observed. Feasible allocations
must be incentive compatible and must satisfy the aggregate resource
constraint in all periods.
When only the welfare of the ﬁrst generation is considered, the plan-
ning problem is equivalent to that of an economy with inﬁnite-lived
individuals. Intuitively, immiseration then results because rewards and
punishments, required for incentives, are best delivered permanently
to smooth dynastic consumption over time. As a result, the consumption
process inherits a random-walk component that leads cross-sectional
inequality to grow without bound. This is consistent with a constant
aggregate endowment only if everyone’s consumption converges to zero.
As a result, no steady-state, cross-sectional distribution with positive con-
sumption exists.
Interpreted in the intergenerational context, this solution requires a
lockstep link between the welfare of parent and child. This perfect
intergenerational transmission of welfare improves parental incentives,
but it exposes future generations to the risk of their dynasty’s history.
Future descendants value insurance against the uncertainty of their an-
cestors’ past shocks, and our welfare criterion captures this.
When future generations are weighted in the social welfare function,
it remains optimal to link the fortunes of parents and children, but no
longer in lockstep. Rewards and punishments are distributed over all
future descendants, but in a front-loaded manner. This creates a mean-
reverting tendency in consumption—instead of a random walk—that is
strong enough to bound long-run inequality. The result is a steady-state
distribution for the cross section of consumption and welfare, with no
one at misery. Moreover, mean reversion ensures a form of social mo-
bility, so that families rise and fall through the ranks incessantly.
It is worth emphasizing that our exercise is not predicated on any
paternalistic concern that individuals do not discount the future ap-
propriately. Rather, the difference between social and private discount-
ing used in our Pareto-efﬁcient analysis arises because the social welfare
function gives direct weight to future generations. However, our formal
analysis can be applied whatever the motivation, paternalistic or not,
for a difference in social and private discounting. For example, Caplin
and Leahy (2004) make a case for a higher social discount factor within
a lifetime.
A methodological contribution of this paper is to reformulate the
social planning problem recursively in a way that extends the ideas
introduced by Spear and Srivastava (1987) to a general-equilibrium sit-368 journal of political economy
uation in which private and social objectives potentially differ. We are
able to reduce the dynamic program to a one-dimensional state variable,
and our analysis and results heavily exploit the resulting Bellman
equation.
The paper most closely related to ours is Phelan (2006), which con-
sidered a social planning problem with no discounting of the future.
Phelan shows that if a steady state for the planning problem exists, then
it must solve a static maximization problem, and solutions to this prob-
lem have strictly positive inequality and social mobility. Our paper es-
tablishes the existence of a steady-state distribution for any difference
in social and private discounting. In contrast to the case with no dis-
counting, there is no valid static problem, so our methods are necessarily
different. Our work is also indirectly related to that of Sleet and Yeltekin
(2004), who study a utilitarian planner that lacks commitment and al-
ways cares for the current generation only. The best equilibrium allo-
cation without commitment is equivalent to the optimal one with com-
mitment but with a more patient welfare criterion. Thus our approach
and results provide an indirect, but effective, way of characterizing the
problem without commitment and establishing the existence of a steady-
state distribution. In effect, lack of commitment, or other political econ-
omy considerations, can provide one motivation for the positive Pareto
weights that future generations command.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II contains some
simple examples to illustrate why weighing future generations leads to
a higher social discount factor and why mean-reverting forces emerge
from any difference between social and private discounting. Section III
introduces the economic environment and sets up the social planning
problem. In Section IV, we develop a recursive version of the planning
problem and establish its relation to the original formulation. The re-
sulting Bellman equation is then used in Section V to characterize the
mean reversion in the solution. Sections VI and VII prove and discuss
the main results on the existence of a steady state for our planning
problem. Section VIII offers some conclusions from the analysis. Proofs
are contained in the Appendix.
II. Social Discounting and Mean Reversion
In this section, we preview the main forces at work in the full model
using a simple deterministic example. We ﬁrst explain why weighing
future generations maps into lower social discounting. We then show
how this affects the optimal inheritability of welfare across generations.
Finally, we relate the latter to the mean reversion force, which guarantees
a steady-state distribution with social mobility in the full model. Ourinequality and social discounting 369
discussion also provides a novel intuition for the immiseration result in
Atkeson-Lucas.
Social Discounting
Imagine a two-period deterministic economy. The parent is alive in the
ﬁrst period, , and is replaced by a single child in the next, . t p 0 t p 1
The child derives utility from his own consumption, so that v p 1
. The parent cares about her own consumption but is also altruistic U(c ) 1
toward the child, so that her welfare is v p U(c )  bv p U(c )  00 10
. bU(c ) 1
A welfare criterion that weighs both agents and serves to trace out
the Pareto frontier between and is , for some weight vv W { v  av 01 0 1
. Equivalently, a ≥ 0
ˆ W p U(c )  (b  a)U(c ) p U(c )  bU(c ), 01 0 1
with the social discount factor given by . ˆ b { b  a
The only difference between the welfare criterion and the objective
of the parent is the rate of discounting. Social discounting depends on
the weight on future generations a. When no direct weight is placed
on children, so that , social and private discounting coincide, a p 0
, which is the case covered by Atkeson and Lucas (1992). When- ˆ b p b
ever children are counted directly in the welfare criterion, , society a 1 0
discounts less than parents do privately, . The child’s consumption ˆ b 1 b
receives more weight in the welfare criterion because it is a public good
that both generations enjoy.
A Planning Problem
In Section III we show that the calculations above generalize to an
inﬁnite-horizon economy and lead to an objective with more patient
geometric discounting: . We now consider a simple planning
 t ˆ  bu(c) t tp0
problem for such an inﬁnite-horizon version.
Now, suppose that there are two dynasties, A and B. In each period,
a planner must divide a ﬁxed endowment 2e between the two dynasties,
giving to A and to B. Suppose that, for some reason, cc p 2e  c A,tB ,tA ,t
the heads of the dynasties are promised differential treatment, so that
the difference in their welfare must be D. The planner’s problem is

11 t ˆ max b[ U(c )  U(2e  c )]  A,tA ,t 22
tp0 {c } A,t370 journal of political economy
subject to

tt bU(c )  bU(2e  c ) p D.  A,tA ,t
tp0 tp0
The ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior optimum are
  t ˆ U (c )1  l(b/b) A,t p , t p 0, 1, …,   t ˆ U (c ) 1  l(b/b) B,t
where l is the Lagrange multipliers on the constraint.
Imperfect Inheritability
Suppose that the founder of dynasty A has been promised higher welfare
so that . The ﬁrst-order condition then reveals that every D 1 0 l 1 0
member of dynasty A enjoys higher consumption, . If , as ˆ c 1 c b p b A,tB ,t
in Atkeson and Lucas (1992), consumption is constant over time for
both groups, and initial differences persist forever. The unequal prom-
ises to the ﬁrst generation have a permanent impact on their descen-
dants. The inheritability of welfare across generations is perfect: the
consumption and welfare of the child move one-to-one with the parent’s
welfare.
In contrast, when , the difference in consumption between the ˆ b 1 b
two dynasties shrinks over time. Consumption declines across genera-
tions for group A and rises for group B. The inheritability of welfare
across generations is imperfect: a child’s consumption varies less than
one-for-one with the parent’s. Indeed, initial differences completely van-
ish asymptotically—initial inequality dies out. Figure 1 illustrates these
dynamics for consumption.
In this simple deterministic example, initial inequality D was taken as
exogenously given. However, in the model with taste shocks, inequality
is continuously generated in order to provide incentives. The dynamics
after a shock are similar to those illustrated here, so that ﬁgure 1 can
be loosely interpreted as an impulse response function. If , shocks ˆ b p b
have a permanent effect on inequality and consumption inherits a
random-walk component. If , the impact of shocks decays over time ˆ b 1 b
and consumption is mean-reverting.
As long as , inequality vanishes in the long run in this deter- ˆ b 1 b
ministic example. With ongoing taste shocks, inequality remains positive
in the long run and the mean-reverting force ensures that inequality
remains bounded. By contrast, when as in Atkeson and Lucas ˆ b p b
(1992), there is no mean reversion, so that shocks accumulate indeﬁ-
nitely and inequality increases without bound.inequality and social discounting 371
Fig. 1.—Consumption paths for groups A and B. Solid lines represent the case with
; the dotted line at is the steady state. The horizontal dashed linesrepresent ˆ b 1 b c p e p 1
the Atkeson-Lucas case with . ˆ b p b
III. An Intergenerational Insurance Problem
At any point in time, the economy is populated by a continuum of
individuals who have identical preferences, live for one period, and are
replaced by a single descendant in the next. Parents born in period t
are altruistic toward their only child, and their welfare satisﬁes vt
v p  [vU(c)  bv ], tt 1 tt t 1
where is the parent’s own consumption, is the altruistic c ≥ 0 b  (0, 1) t
weight placed on the descendant’s welfare , and is a taste v v  V t1 t
shock that is assumed to be identically and independently distributed
across individuals and time. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (a) The set of taste shocks V is ﬁnite. (b) The utility
function is concave and continuously differentiable for with U(c) c 1 0
and .
   lim U (c) p  lim U (c) p 0 cr0 cr
This speciﬁcation of altruism is consistent with individuals having a
preference over the entire future consumption of their dynasty given
by

s v p b  [v U(c )]. (1)  tt 1 tst s
sp0
In each period, a resource constraint limits aggregate consumption to
be no greater than some constant aggregate endowment . e 1 0
The following notation and conventions will be used. We refer to
as utility and the discounted, expected utility as welfare. Let U(c) v t t
denote the probability of ; we adopt the normalization that p(v) v  V372 journal of political economy
and deﬁne and . The cost [v] p vp(v) p 1 v p maxVv p minV vV
function is deﬁned as the inverse of the utility function: C(u) C {
. Dynastic welfare belongs to the set with extremes
1 Uv U ( )/(1  b) t 
and , which may be ﬁnite or ¯ v { U(0)/(1  b) v { lim U(c)/(1  b) cr
inﬁnite.
Taste shock realizations are privately observed, so any mechanism for
allocating consumption must be incentive compatible. The revelation
principle allows us to restrict attention to mechanisms that rely on truth-
ful reports of these shocks. Thus each dynasty faces a sequence of con-
sumption functions , where represents an individual’s consump-
t {c} c(v) tt
tion after reporting the history . It is more convenient
t v { (v , v ,… ,v) 01 t
to work with the implied allocation for utility with
t {u } u(v) { tt
. A dynasty’s reporting strategy is a sequence of functions
t U(c(v)) j { {j} tt
that maps histories of shocks into a current report . Any
t1 t ˆ j : V r Vv v t t
strategy j induces a history of reports . We use to
tt 1 t1 j : V r Vj *
denote the truth-telling strategy with for all .
tt t 1 j*(v) p vv  V tt
We identify each dynasty with its founder’s welfare entitlement v.W e
assume, without loss of generality, that all dynasties with the same en-
titlement v receive the same treatment. We then let w denote a cu-
mulative distribution function for v across dynasties. An allocation is a
sequence of functions for each v. For any given initial distribution
v {u } t
of entitlements w and resources e, we say that an allocation is feasible
v {u } t
if (i) it delivers expected utility of v to all initial dynasties entitled to v:

tv t t v p bvu (v)Pr( v); (2)  tt
tt 1 tp0 v V
(ii) it is incentive compatible for all v:

tv t v t t t bv[u (v)  u (j(v) ) ]Pr( v) ≥ 0f o r a l l j (3)  tt t
tt 1 tp0 v V
whenever this sum converges; and (iii) total consumption does not ex-
ceed the ﬁxed endowment e in all periods:
vt t C(u (v)) Pr (v)dw(v) ≤ e, t p 0, 1, …. (4)   t
tt 1 v V
Deﬁne to be the lowest endowment e such that there exists an e*(w)
allocation satisfying (2)–(4), which is precisely the efﬁciency problem
studied in Atkeson and Lucas (1992).inequality and social discounting 373
Social Discounting
We have adopted the same preferences, technology, and informational
assumptions as in Atkeson and Lucas (1992). Our only departure is to
introduce the planning objective

t ˆ b  [vU(c)] (5)  1 tt
tp0
for each dynasty, which is equivalent to the preferences in (1), except
for the discount factor . Our motivation for this objective is that ˆ b 1 b
it can be derived from a welfare criterion that places direct weight on
the welfare of future generations. To see this, consider the sum of ex-
pected welfare, , using strictly positive weights :  v {a} 1 tt

a v p d [vU(c)], (6)  t 1 tt 1 tt
tp0 tp0
where . Then the discount factor
tt 1 … d { ba  ba  ba  a t 01 t1 t
satisﬁes
da t1 t1 p b  1 b,
dd tt
so that social preferences are more patient. Future generations are al-
ready indirectly valued through the altruism of the current generation.
If, in addition, they are also directly included in the welfare function,
the social discount factor must be higher than b.
3
In particular, weighing future generations with geometric t p 1, 2, …
Pareto weights gives
t ˆ a p b t
 1 t ˆ a v p b  [vU(c)]  v (7)  t 1 t 1 tt 0 {} ˆ tp1 tp0 b  b
for . The ﬁrst term is identical to the expression in (5); the second ˆ b 1 b
is a constant when initial welfare promises for the founding gener- v0
ation are given, as they are in the social planning problem deﬁned below.
Planning Problem
Deﬁne the social optimum as a feasible allocation that maximizes the
integral of (5) with respect to distribution w. That is, the social planning
3 Bernheim (1989) performs similar intergenerational discount factor calculations in
his welfare analysis of a deterministic dynastic saving model. Caplin and Leahy (2004)
argue that these ideas also apply to intrapersonal discounting within a lifetime, leading
to a social discount factor that is greater than the private one not only across generations
but within generations as well.374 journal of political economy
problem given an initial distribution of welfare entitlements w and an
endowment level e is

tv t t ˆ S(w; e) { sup bvu (v)Pr( v)dw(v) (8)   tt
tt 1 v tp0 v V {u } t
subject to (2), (3), and (4). The constraint set is nonempty as long as
. If , then the only feasible allocation is the one char- e ≥ e*(w) e p e*(w)
acterized by Atkeson-Lucas; we study cases with . This problem e 1 e*(w)
is convex: the objective is linear, constraints (2) and (3) are linear, and
the resource constraints (4) are strictly convex.
The way we have deﬁned the social planning problem imposes that
initial welfare entitlements v be delivered exactly, in the sense that the
promise-keeping constraints (2) are equalities instead of inequalities.
Alternatively, suppose that the founder of each dynasty is indexed by
some minimum welfare entitlement , with distribution . The Pareto ˜ ˜ v w
problem maximizes the integral of the welfare criterion (7) subject to
delivering or more to the founders and incentive compatibility. The ˜ v
two problems are related: the solution to the Pareto problem solves the
social planning problem for some distribution w that ﬁrst-order sto-
chastically dominates (so that for all v). In particular, ˜ ˜ ww (v) ≤ w(v)
comparing the terms in (7) with (5) implies that the Pareto problem
chooses w to maximize
S(w; e)  vdw(v) (9) 
subject to for all v. In general, depending on the given ˜ w(v) ≤ w(v)
, the constraints of delivering the initial welfare entitlements or ˜ ˜ w v
more may be slack, so that may be optimal. However, we shall ˜ w ( w
show that setting is optimal for initial distributions of entitle- ˜ w p w
ments that are steady states, as deﬁned below. Our strategy is to ˜ w
solve the social planning problem and then show that it coincides
with the Pareto problem’s solution in Section VII.
Steady States
The social planning problem takes the initial distribution of welfare
entitlements w as given. In later periods the current cross-sectional dis-
tribution of continuation welfare is a sufﬁcient statistic for the re- w t
maining social planning problem: the problem is recursive with state
variable . It follows that the solution to the social planning problem w t
from any period t onward, , is a time-independent function of
v  {u } tss p0inequality and social discounting 375
the current distribution , which evolves according to a stationary re- w t
cursion , for some ﬁxed mapping W. w p Ww t1 t
We focus on distributions of welfare entitlements such that the w*
solution to the social planning problem features, in each period, a cross-
sectional distribution of continuation utilities that is also distributed vt
according to . In this case, the cross-sectional distribution of con- w*
sumption also replicates itself over time. We term any distribution of
entitlements with these properties a steady state. A steady state cor- w*
responds to a ﬁxed point of this mapping, . w* p Ww*
In the Atkeson-Lucas case, with , the nonexistence of a steady ˆ b p b
state with positive consumption is a consequence of the immiseration
result: starting from any nontrivial initial distribution w and resources
, the sequence of distributions converges weakly to the distri- e p e*(w)
bution having full mass at misery , with zero con- v p U(0)/(1  b)
sumption for everyone. We seek nontrivial steady states that exhaust w*
a strictly positive aggregate endowment e in all periods.
Using the entire distribution as a state variable is one way to ap- w t
proach the social planning problem. Indeed, this is the method adopted
by Atkeson and Lucas (1992). They were able to keep the analysis man-
ageable, despite the large dimensionality of the state variable, by ex-
ploiting the homogeneity of the problem with constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) preferences. In contrast, even in the CRRA case, our
model lacks this homogeneity, making such a direct approach intrac-
table.
4 Consequently, in the next section, we attack the problem differ-
ently, using a dynamic program with a one-dimensional state variable.
5
The idea is that the continuation welfare of each dynasty follows a vt
Markov process and that steady states are invariant distributions of this
process.
IV. A Bellman Equation
In this section we approach the social planning problem by studying a
relaxed version of it, whose solution coincides with that of the original
problem at steady states. The relaxed problem has two important ad-
vantages. First, it can be solved by studying a set of subproblems, one
for each dynasty, thereby avoiding the need to keep track of the entire
distribution in the population. Second, each subproblem admits a w t
4 Indeed, the homogeneity in Atkeson-Lucas is intimately linked to their immiseration
result: it implies that rewards and punishments are permanent andare deliveredbyshifting
the entire sequence of consumption up or down multiplicatively. In our case, even with
CRRA preferences, homogeneity breaks down and mean reversion emerges, preventing
immiseration.
5 A similar approach is taken in Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995), Atkeson and Lucas (1995),
and others.376 journal of political economy
one-dimensional recursive formulation, which we are able to charac-
terize quite sharply. We believe that the general route we develop here
may be useful in other contexts.
Deﬁne a relaxed planning problem by replacing the sequence of resource
constraints (4) in the social planning problem (8) with a single inter-
temporal constraint

vt t QC (u (v)) Pr (v)dw(v) ≤ eQ (10)    tt t
tt 1 tp0 v V tp0
for some positive sequence with . One can interpret this
 {Q }  Q !  tt tp0
problem as representing a small open economy facing intertemporal
prices .
6 The original and relaxed versions of the social planning {Q } t
problem are related in that any solution to the latter that happens to
satisfy the resource constraints (4) is also a solution to the former.
7 It
follows that any steady-state solution to the relaxed problem is a steady-
state solution to the original one, since at a steady state the intertemporal
constraint (10) implies the resource constraints (4). A steady state re-
quires .
t ˆ Q p b t
Consider then the intertemporal resource constraint (10) with
:
t ˆ Q p b t

tv t t t ˆ ˆ b C(u (v)) Pr (v)dw(v) ≤ e b.( 1 1 )    t
tt 1 tp0 v V tp0
Letting h denote the multiplier on this constraint, we form the Lagrang-
ian (omitting the constant term due to e)
v L { Ldw(v), (12) 
where

v t vt vt t ˆ L { b[vu (v)  hC(u (v) ) ]Pr( v).  tt t
tt 1 tp0 v V
6 This is related to the decentralization result in Atkeson and Lucas (1992, sec. 7, the-
orem 1), although they do not use it, as we do here, to characterize the solution.
7 Since the problem is convex, a Lagrangian argument establishes the converse: there
must exist some positive sequence such that the solution to the original socialplanning {Q} t
problem also solves the relaxed problem. This is analogous to the second theorem of
welfare economics for our environment. However, we will not require this converse result
to construct a steady-state solution.inequality and social discounting 377
We study the maximization of subject to (2) and (3). Maximizing LL
is equivalent to the pointwise optimization of for each v:
v L
v k(v) { supL (13)
v {u } t
subject to (2) and (3). We call this subproblem, for a given v and h,
the component planning problem. Its connection with the relaxed problem
is that for any e there exists a positive multiplier h such that an allocation
solves the relaxed planning problem with endowment e if and only
v {u } t
if for each v the allocation solves the component planning problem
v {u } t
given v and h (Luenberger 1969, chap. 8).
Our ﬁrst result characterizes the value function , deﬁned from a k(v)
sequence problem, showing that it satisﬁes a Bellman equation.
Theorem 1. The value function of the component planning prob-
lem deﬁned by equation (13) is continuous, is concave, and satisﬁes k(v)
the Bellman equation
ˆ k(v) p max[vu(v)  hC(u(v))  bk(w(v))] (14)
u,w
subject to
v p [vu(v)  bw(v)] (15)
and
     vu(v)  bw(v) ≥ vu(v )  bw(v )f o r a l l v, v  V. (16)
This recursive formulation imposes a promise-keeping constraint (15)
and an incentive constraint (16). The latter rules out one-shot deviations
from truth-telling, guaranteeing that telling the truth today is optimal
if the truth is told in future periods, which is necessary for full incentive
compatibility (3). Full incentive compatibility (3) is taken care of in
(14) by evaluating the value function deﬁned from the sequence prob-
lem at the continuation welfare: in the next period, envision the planner
as solving the remaining sequence problem, selecting an allocation for
each that is incentive compatible for . Then any pair w(v) t p 1, 2, …
that satisﬁes (15) and (16), pasted with the corresponding (u(v), w(v))
continuation allocations for each , describes an allocation that sat- w(v)
isﬁes (2) and (3).
Among other things, theorem 1 shows that the maximization on the
right-hand side of the Bellman equation is uniquely attained by some
continuous policy functions and for u and w, respectively.
uw g (v, v) g (v, v)
We emphasize that these policy functions solve the maximization in the
Bellman equation (14) using the value function deﬁned from the k(v)378 journal of political economy
sequence problem (13).
8 For any initial welfare entitlement v, an allo-
cation can then be generated from the policy functions by
uw {u }( g , g ) t
, with and . Our next
tu t 1 tw t 1 u(v) p g (v, v(v )) v p vv (v) p g (v, v(v )) tt t 0 t1 tt
result provides a connection between allocations generated this way and
solutions to the component planning problem (13).
Theorem 2. For any (v, h), if an allocation attains the maximum {u } t
in the component planning problem (13), then it is generated by
. Conversely, if an allocation generated by is such
uw uw (g , g ){ u }( g , g ) t
that for each j
tt 1 t1 limsup bv(j (v )) ≥ 0, (17) 1 t
tr
then it attains the maximum in the component planning problem (13).
The ﬁrst part of theorem 2 implies either that the solution to the
relaxed planning problem is generated by the policy functions or that
there is no solution at all. From the second part of theorem 2, a solution
is guaranteed if the limiting condition (17) can be veriﬁed. The proof
proceeds by showing that the allocation generated by the policy func-
tions is optimal if it satisﬁes the incentive compatibility constraint (3);
the role of the limiting condition (17) is to ensure the latter.
9 Conditions
(15) and (16) ensure that ﬁnite deviations from truth-telling are not
optimal; condition (17) then rules out inﬁnite deviations. Condition
(17) is trivially satisﬁed for utility functions that are bounded below;
proposition 5 below veriﬁes this condition when utility is unbounded
below.
V. Mean Reversion
In this section we use the Bellman equation to characterize the solution
to the planning problem and to show that it displays mean reversion.
Our ﬁrst result establishes that is differentiable and strictly concave k(v)
with an interior peak.
8 If one assumes bounded utility, then when the contractionmappingtheoremisapplied,
the Bellman equation is guaranteed to have a unique solution, which must then coincide
with deﬁned from the sequence problem. However, we do not assume bounded utility k(v)
and, for our purposes, ﬁnd it unnecessary to solve ﬁxed points of the Bellman equation
or prove that it has a unique solution. Instead, we work directly with deﬁned from k(v)
the sequence problem (13) and simply exploit the fact that this function satisﬁes the
Bellman equation.
9 The proof of theorem 2 applies versions of the principle of optimalitytoverifyincentive
compatibility. In particular, for any ( , ) and an initial , a dynasty faces a recursive
uw gg v 0
dynamic programming problem with state variable and with the report as the control. ˆ v v tt
Conditions (15) and (16) then amount to guessing and verifying a solution to the Bellman
equation of the agent’s problem, i.e., that the identity function satisﬁes the Bellman
equation with truth-telling. The limiting condition (17) then veriﬁes that this represents
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Proposition 1. The value function is strictly concave; it is k(v)
differentiable on the interior of its domain, with . If
  lim k (v) p  vrv ¯
utility is unbounded below, then . Otherwise
  lim k (v) p 1 vrv —
.
  lim k (v) p  vrv —
The shape of the value function is important because mean reversion
occurs toward the interior peak, as we show next.
Let l be the multiplier on the promise-keeping constraint (15) and
let be the multipliers on the incentive constraints (16). The
  m(v, v )
ﬁrst-order condition for is u(v)
  u      [v  hC (g (v, v))]p(v)  vlp(v)  vm(v, v )  vm (v , v) ≤ 0, 
   v Vv V
with equality if is interior. Given the limits for in proposition
u   g (v, v) k (v)
1, the solution for must be interior and satisfy the ﬁrst-order w(v)
condition
  w    ˆ bk (g (v, v))p(v)  blp(v)  bm (v, v )  bm (v , v) p 0. 
   v Vv V
Incentive compatibility implies that is nondecreasing as a func-
u g (v, v)
tion of v; similarly, is nonincreasing in v. Using the envelope
w g (v, v)
condition and summing over v, we get
  k (v) p l
b   w   k (g (v, v))p(v) p k (v). (18)  ˆ vV b
In sequential notation, this condition is
b     [k (v )] p k (v), (19) t1 t1 t ˆ b
where is generated by the policy function . Since , the
t1 w ˆ {v(v )} g b/b ! 1 t
Markov process regresses toward zero. By proposition 1, the value
  {k (v)} t
function has an interior maximum at , where , that is
  k(v) v* k (v*) p 0
strictly higher than misery . Reversion occurs toward this interior point. v
To provide incentives, the planner rewards the descendants of an
individual reporting a low taste shock. Rewards can take two forms, and
it is optimal to make use of both. The ﬁrst is standard and involves
spending more on a dynasty in present-value terms. The second is more
subtle and exploits differences in preferences: it is to allow an adjust-
ment in the pattern of consumption, for a given present value, in the
direction preferred by individuals relative to the planner.
10 Since indi-
10 Some readers may recognize this last method as the time-honored system of rewards
and punishments used by parents when conceding their child’s favorite snack or reducing
their television time. In these instances, the child values some goods more than the parent
wishes, and the parent uses them to provide incentives.380 journal of political economy
viduals are more impatient than the planner, this form of reward is
delivered by tilting the consumption proﬁle toward the present. Earlier
consumption dates are used more intensively to provide incentives: re-
wards and punishments are front-loaded.
Economically, this mean reversion implies an interesting form of so-
cial mobility. Divide the population into two, those above and those
below . Then mobility is ensured between these groups: descendants v*
of individuals with current welfare above will eventually fall below it, v*
and vice versa. This rise and fall of families illustrates one form of
intergenerational mobility.
It is convenient to reexpress equation (19) as
bb     [1  k (v )] p [1  k (v)]  1  , (20) t1 t1 t ˆ ˆ bb
so that the stochastic process reverts toward one. Our next
  {1  k (v)} t
result derives upper and lower bounds for the evolution of this process.
Proposition 2. For ,
  1  k (v) ≥ 0
bb    w   g[1  k (v)]  1  ≤ 1  k (g (v, v)) ≤ g[1  k (v)]  1  (21) () () ˆˆ bb
for some constants and with and , as . ˆˆ ggg ≤ b/b ≤ gg g r b/bv /v r 1
Moreover, consumption is zero if and only if .
u   C(g (v, v)) 1  k (v) ≤ 0
The bounds in (21) are instrumental in proving that a steady-state
distribution exists, but they also illustrate a powerful force away from
misery. Proposition 2 can be seen as providing a corridor around
the expected value for the realization
  ˆˆ (b/b)[1  k (v)]  1  (b/b)
. This corridor becomes narrower as is decreased
  w   1  k (g (v, v)) 1  k (v)
and shrinks to zero as . This implies that welfare must rise,
  1  k (v) r 0
for all realized shocks, if current welfare is low enough. Indeed, if utility
is unbounded below, then next period’s welfare remains
w g (v, v)
bounded even as . No matter how badly a parent is to be pun- v r 
ished, the child is always somewhat spared.
When the solution for is interior, u(v)
  u   h C (g (v, v))p(v) p 1  k (v). 
vV
Equation (20) then implies
1 b 1 b 1
 p   1  . t1 t1    () [] [ ] ˆˆ U (c ) U (c) h bb t1 t
For example, in the logarithmic utility case, , implying that
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the one-step-ahead forecast for consumption mean-reverts x p  [c] tt 1 t
at rate toward its mean, . That is,
1 ˆ b/bh
bb 1
 [x ] p x  1  . t1 tt 1 () ˆ ˆ h bb
Moreover, if the amplitude of taste shocks is not too wide, we can guar-
antee that and . If , then the ergodic set for is
  g ! 1 g 1 0 g ! 11  k (v)
bounded above, implying that welfare is bounded away from ; ¯ vv t
whereas if , then the ergodic set for is bounded away from
  g 1 01  k (v)
zero and consumption is bounded away from zero. In this way, one can
guarantee that inequality of welfare and consumption remains bounded.
VI. Existence of a Steady State
In this section we show that a steady-state invariant distribution exists.
The proof relies on the mean reversion in equation (19) and the bounds
in proposition 2.
Proposition 3. The Markov process implied by has an in-
w {v} g t
variant distribution with no mass at misery and w* w*(v) p 0
if any of the following conditions holds: utility is un-
  ∫ k (v)dw*(v) p 0
bounded below, utility is bounded above, , or . g ! 1 g 1 0
When any of the conditions of proposition 3 are satisﬁed, theorem
2 leaves open only two possibilities. Either the social planning problem
admits a steady-state invariant distribution or no solution exists. This
contrasts with the Atkeson-Lucas case, with , where a solution ˆ b p b
exists but does not admit a steady state. Later in this section we verify
the second part of theorem 2 to conﬁrm that a solution to the social
planning problem can be guaranteed and a steady state exists.
Our Bellman equation also provides an efﬁcient way of solving the
planning problem. We illustrate this with two examples, one analytical
and another numerical.
Example 1. Suppose that utility is CRRA with , so that j p 1/2
for and for . Atkeson-Lucas show
1/2 1/2 2 U(c) p 2 cc ≥ 0 C(u) p u /2 u ≥ 0
that for the optimum involves consumption inequality growing ˆ b p b
without bound and leading to immiseration.
The Bellman equation for is ˆ b 1 b
h 2 ˆ k(v) p max vu(v)  u(v)  bk(w(v)) [] 2 u,w
subject to (15) and (16). If we ignore the nonnegativity constraints on
u and w, this is a linear-quadratic dynamic programming problem, so382 journal of political economy
Fig. 2.—Invariant distributions for welfare, measured in consumption-equivalent units
, for various values of . ˆ C((1  b)v) b
the value function is a quadratic function and the policy functions k(v)
are linear in v:
uu u g (v, v) p g (v)v  g (v) 10
and
ww w g (v, v) p g (v)v  g (v). 10
For taste shocks that are not too wide, we can guarantee strictly positive
consumption and a bounded ergodic set for welfare. The nonnegativity
constraints are then satisﬁed, so that this solves the problem that imposes
them.
Example 2. To illustrate the numerical value of our recursive for-
mulation, we now compute the solution for the logarithmic utility case
with , , , ,
1 U(c) p log(c) b p 0.9 e p h p 0.6 v p 1.2 v p 0.75 p p hl
, and several values of . Figure 2 displays steady-state distributions ˆ 0.5 b
of welfare in consumption-equivalent units . The distribu- C(v(1  b))
tions have a smooth bell curve shape. This must be due to the smooth,
mean-reverting dynamics of the model, since it cannot be a direct con-
sequence of our two-point distribution of taste shocks. Dispersion ap-
pears to increase for lower values of , supporting the natural conjecture ˆ b
that as we approach , the Atkeson-Lucas case, the invariant dis- ˆ b r b
tributions diverge.
We now brieﬂy discuss issues of uniqueness and stability of the in-
variant distribution guaranteed by proposition 3. This question is of
economic interest because it represents an even stronger notion of social
mobility than that implied by the mean reversion condition (19) dis-
cussed in the previous section. Suppose that the economy ﬁnds itself at
a steady state . Then convergence from any initial toward the w* v0
distribution means that the distribution of welfare for distant de- w*inequality and social discounting 383
scendants is independent of an individual’s present condition. The past
exerts some inﬂuence on the present, but its inﬂuence dies out over
time. The inheritability of welfare is imperfect, and the advantages or
disadvantages of distant ancestors are eventually wiped out.
Indeed, the solution may display this strong notion of social mobility.
To see this, suppose that the ergodic set for is compact, which is
  {k (v)} t
guaranteed if . Then if the policy function is monotone
w g ! 1 g (v, v)
in v, the invariant distribution is unique and stable: starting from w*
any initial distribution , the sequence of distributions , generated w {w} 0 t
by , converges weakly to .
11 The required monotonicity of the policy
w g w*
functions was satisﬁed by examples 1 and 2 and seems plausible more
generally.
12 Another approach suggests uniqueness and convergence
without relying on monotonicity of the policy functions. Grunwald et
al. (2000) show that one-dimensional, irreducible Markov processes with
the Feller property that are bounded below and are conditional linear
autoregressive, as implied by (19), have a unique and stable invariant
distribution. All their hypotheses have been veriﬁed here except for the
technical condition of irreducibility.
13 Although we do not pursue this
further, our discussion illustrates how the forces for reversion in (19)
might be exploited to establish uniqueness and convergence.
We have focused on steady states in which the distribution of welfare
replicates itself over time. However, for the logarithmic utility case we
can also characterize transitional dynamics.
Proposition 4. If utility is logarithmic, , then for any U(c) p log(c)
initial distribution of entitlements w there exists an endowment level
such that the solution to the social planning problem is gen- ˆ e p e(w)
erated by the policy functions starting from w. The function
uw ˆ (g , g ) e
is increasing in that if ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates , then
ba ww
.
ab ˆˆ e(w ) ! e(w )
One can apply this result to the case with no initial inequality, where
dynasties are all started at solving . The cross-sectional
  v* k (v*) p 0
distribution of welfare and consumption fans out over time starting from
this initial egalitarian position. The issues of convergence and unique-
ness discussed above now acquire an additional economic interpreta-
tion. It implies that the transition is stable, with the cross-sectional dis-
tributions of welfare and consumption converging over time to the
steady state.
11 This follows since the conditional-expectation equation (19) ensures enough mixing
to apply Hopenhayn and Prescott’s theorem (see Stokey and Lucas 1989, 382–83).
12 Indeed, it can be shown that must be strictly increasinginv.However,although
w g (v, v)
we know of no counterexample, we have not found conditions that ensure the monoto-
nicity of in v for .
w g (v, v) v ( v
13 We conjecture that this condition could be guaranteed in an extension with a con-
tinuous distribution of taste shocks.384 journal of political economy
As mentioned in Section IV, for any utility function one can char-
acterize the solution for any as the solution to a relaxed problem (w, e)
with some sequence that is not necessarily exponential, that is, {Q } t
imposing the general intertemporal constraint (10) instead of (11).
Proposition 4 identiﬁes the distributions and endowment pairs (w, e)
that lead to exponential in the logarithmic case. More generally, {Q } t
with logarithmic utility for any pair , we can show that
t ˆ (w, e) Q p b  t
for some constant a. The entire optimal allocation can then be
t ab
characterized by the policy functions from a nonstationary Bellman
equation. Since is asymptotically exponential (i.e.,
t ˆ {Q } lim b Q p tt r t
), the long-run dynamics are dominated by the policy functions
u 1( g ,
from the problem with that we have characterized.
wt ˆ g ) Q p b t
We have shown the existence of a steady state generated by the w*
policy function . We now provide sufﬁcient conditions to ensure that
w g
is also a steady state for the social planning problem. This involves w*
two things. We ﬁrst establish that allocations generated by the policy
functions are indeed incentive compatible by verifying the limiting con-
dition (17) in theorem 2; this guarantees that, given and h,t h e w*
allocation maximizes the Lagrangian (12). Second, we verify that av-
erage consumption is ﬁnite under , so that there exists some endow- w*
ment e for which the resource constraints (4) and (10) hold. It follows
that the allocations generated by solve the social planning prob-
uw (g , g )
lem, given e and . w*
Proposition 5. The allocation generated by the policy functions
starting at any solves the component planning problem in
uw (g , g ) v0
any of the following cases: (a) utility is bounded above, (b) utility is
bounded below, (c) utility is logarithmic, or (d)o r . g ! 1 g 1 0
Next, we give sufﬁcient conditions to guarantee that total consump-
tion is ﬁnite at the steady state . If the ergodic set for welfare v is w*
bounded away from the extremes, then consumption is bounded and
total consumption is ﬁnite. Even when a bounded ergodic set for welfare
v cannot be ensured, we can guarantee that total consumption is ﬁnite
for a large class of utility functions.
Proposition 6. Total consumption is ﬁnite under the invariant
distribution , w*
u C(g (v, v))p(v)dw*(v) ! ,  
vV
if either (a) the function is convex over for some
   ¯ C (U(c)) p 1/U (c) c ≥ c
or (b)o r . ¯ c !  g 1 0 g ! 1
It is worth remarking that the hypotheses of all these propositions
are met for a wide range of primitives. In particular, they hold for any
utility function as long as the amplitude of taste shocks is not too wide,inequality and social discounting 385
so that we can ensure that or . They also hold for any arbitrary g 1 0 g ! 1
amplitude of taste shocks when utility is logarithmic or when utility is
bounded above and is asymptotically convex. For example, At-
  1/U (c)
keson and Lucas (1992) focused on the CRRA speciﬁcation U(c) p
with . All our results apply in this speciﬁcation: for
1j c /(1  j) j 1 0
with any shock distribution and for with shocks j  [1, ) j  (0, 1)
that are not too wide.
The steady-state distribution w and the implied value of total con-
sumption will generally vary with h. Thus different values h translate
into different required endowments e. For the CRRA case, we can say
that steady-state consumption is a power function of h and thus has full
range. In fact, in this case the entire solution for consumption is ho-
mogeneous of degree one in the value of the endowment e. This ensures
a steady-state solution to the social planning problem for any endow-
ment level.
VII. Pareto Problem
We now return to the Pareto problem (9) and its relation to the social
planning problem. Recall that the former is exactly as the latter except
that the promise-keeping constraints are inequalities instead of equal-
ities. The next result establishes that these inequality constraints bind
for steady-state distributions with strictly positive consumption. Thus w*
the solutions to the Pareto and social planning problems coincide. The
proof relies on the fact that a marginal increase in v contributes
to the welfare criterion (9) (see also [7]) and that ,
    k (v)  1 k (v) ! 1
unless consumption is zero for some agents. Recall that was S(w; e)
deﬁned in (8).
Proposition 7. Let denote a steady state for the social planning w*
problem. Suppose that consumption is strictly positive for all agents, so
that for all v in the support of . Then solves
u C(g (v, v)) 1 0 w* w p w*
the Pareto problem
max S(w; e)  vdw(v)  []
w
subject to
w(v) ≤ w*(v)f o r a l l v.
Thus steady states for the social planning problem coincide with
steady states for the Pareto problem as long as consumption is pos-
itive. That is, if the Pareto problem is started with the distribution
, then it is replicated over time and for all ˜ w p w* w p w* t p 0, 1, t
. By implication, the Pareto optimum is then time-consistent: the …386 journal of political economy
initial solution at also solves the Pareto problem at any future t p 0
period t. In other words, this Pareto-efﬁcient allocation is ex post
Pareto efﬁcient. Note that the condition that consumption be strictly
positive is guaranteed if utility is unbounded below or if the ampli-
tude of the taste shocks is not too wide so that (see proposition g 1 0
2).
In the Pareto problem (9), the welfare of future generations was
aggregated using geometric Pareto weights. We now map these weights
into their welfare implications and discuss a planning problem that is
cast directly in terms of welfare, without Pareto weights.
Starting from the steady state , the optimum for the Pareto problem w*
with weights for has and delivers a constant ex-
t ˆ a p b t ≥ 1 w p w* tt
pected welfare level to all future generations. Consider V* { vdw*(v) ∫
then the problem of maximizing the expected welfare  [v] p 1 s
of any particular generation subject to delivering expected vd w(v) s ≥ 1 ∫ ss s
welfare of at least for all other future generations, V*
vdw(v) ≥ V*, (22)  tt t
while delivering to the ﬁrst generation in an incentive-compatible ˜ w ≤ w 0
way for some given initial distribution . Thus this planning problem ˜ w
solves for an efﬁcient point on the frontier of attainable welfare for
founding members of each dynasty, , and expected welfare for future v0
generations, for . A steady state for the Pareto  [v] t p 1, 2, … w* 1 t
problem (9) is also a steady state for this planning problem and rep-
resents a symmetric point on this frontier: given and ˜ w p w* V* p
, the solution has . The Pareto weights represent
t ˆ vdw*(v) w p w* a p b ∫ tt
the Lagrange multipliers on the inequality constraints (22).
VIII. Conclusions
How should privately felt parental altruism affect the social contract?
What are the long-run implications for inequality? To address these
questions, we modeled the trade-off between equality of opportunity for
newborns and incentives for altruistic parents. In our model, society
should exploit altruism to motivate parents, linking the welfare of chil-
dren to that of their parents. If future generations are included in the
welfare function, this inheritability should be tempered and the exis-
tence of a steady state is ensured, where welfare and consumption are
mean-reverting, long-run inequality is bounded, social mobility is pos-
sible, and misery is avoided by everyone.
The backbone of our model requires a trade-off between insurance
and incentives. The source for this trade-off is inessential. In this paper,inequality and social discounting 387
we adopted the Atkeson-Lucas taste-shock speciﬁcation for purposes of
comparison. In Farhi and Werning (2006), we study a dynamic Mirrlees-
ian model—with productivity shocks instead of taste shocks—and ﬁnd
that a progressive estate tax implements efﬁcient allocations by provid-
ing the necessary mean reversion across generations.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
The value function deﬁned by (13) is weakly concave since the objective k(v)
function is concave and the constraint set convex. Weak concavity implies con-
tinuity over the interior of its domain: . If utility is bounded below, then ¯ (v, v)
continuity at is established as follows. Deﬁne the ﬁrst-best value function ¯ v

tt t t ˆ k*(v) { max b[vu(v)hC(u(v) ) ]Pr(v)  tt t
tt 1 tp0 v V {u } t
subject to

tt t v p bvu(v)Pr(v).  tt
tt 1 tp0 v V
Then is continuous and with equality at . Since is weakly k*(v) k(v) ≤ k*(v) vk (v)
convex, . Toward a contradiction,suppose .Then lim k(v) ≥ k(v) lim k(v) 1 k(v) vfv vfv — —
0 ≤ lim[k*(v)k(v)] p k*(v)limk(v) ! k*(v)k(v),
vfvv fv
a contradiction since . Thus must be continuous at . This k(v)k*(v) p 0 k(v) v
completes the proof that is continuous. k(v)
We ﬁrst show that the constraint (11) with implies that utility and ˆ q p b
continuation welfare are well deﬁned. Toward a contradiction, suppose that
T
t lim b  vu  st t
tp0 Tr
is not deﬁned, for some . This implies that s ≥ 1
T
t lim b max{ vu ,0 }p .  st t
tp0 Tr
Since utility is concave, (i.e., ) for some , vu ≤ AC(u)B vU(c) ≤ AcBA , B 1 0
so it follows that
TT T
tt t ˆ b max{ vu ,0 }≤ A b [C(u )] B ≤ A b [C(u )] B.   st t s t s t
tp0 tp0 tp0
Taking the limit yields . Since there are ﬁnitely many
T t ˆ lim  b  [C(u )] p  Tr 1 t tp0
histories , this implies . If there is a nonzero
T ss 1 t ˆ v  V lim  b  [C(u )] p  Tr 1 t tp0
measure of such agents, this implies a contradiction of the intertemporal con-
straint (11) and thus of at least one resource constraint in (4). Thus, for both388 journal of political economy
the relaxed and the original social planning problems, utility and continuation
welfare are well deﬁned, which is important for the recursive formulation.
We now prove two lemmas that imply the rest of the theorem. Consider the
optimization problem on the right-hand side of the Bellman equation:
ˆ sup[vu(v)hC(u(v)) bk(w(v))] (A1)
u,w
subject to (15) and (16). Deﬁne and ˆ m { max [vU(c)hc] k(v) { k(v) c≥0,vV
. The maximization in (A1) is then equivalent, up to constants, to ˆ m/(1 b) ≤ 0
ˆˆ sup[vu(v)hC(u(v)) mbk(w(v))] (A 2)
u,w
subject to (15) and (16). The objective function in (A2) is nonpositive, which
simpliﬁes the arguments below.
Lemma A1. The supremum in (A1), or equivalently (A2), is attained.
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that utility is unbounded below. We show that
ˆˆ limk(v) p limk(v) p  (A3)
¯ vrvv r
and then use this result to restrict, without loss, the optimization within a com-
pact set, ensuring that a maximum is attained. To establish these limits, deﬁne
the function

tt t ˆˆ h(v; b) { sup b  [vu(v)hC(u(v)) m]  1 tt t
t tp0 {u (v )} t
subject to . Since this corresponds to the same problem but
 tt v p   bvu(v) 1 tt tp0
without the incentive constraints, it follows that . Since ˆ ˆ k(v) ≤ h(v, b) vu
and , it follows that ˆ hC(u)m ≤ 0 b ! b
m ˆ ˆ h(v, b) ≤ h(v, b) p vhC(v, b) ,( A 4 )
1b
where

tt ˆ C(v, b) { inf b  [C(u(v))]  1
t tp0 {u(v )}
subject to

tt v p b  [vu(v)].  1 t
tp0
This is a standard allocation problem,withsolution forsome
t   1 u(v) p (C )( vg(v)) t
positive multiplier , increasing in v and such that and g(v) lim g(v) p 0 vr
. Then lim g(v) p  vr
1   1 ˆ C(v, b) p [C((C )( vg(v)))]
1b
(note that here represents the inverse function of
  1 (C ):  r U( ) inequality and social discounting 389
; i.e., if , then ), so that
     1 C (u):U( ) r  y p C (x)( C )( y) p x lim h(v,  vr
and . Using the inequality (A4) establishes b) p  lim h(v, b) p  vr
and , which, in turn, imply the limits ˆˆ lim h(v, b) p  lim h(v, b) p  vr vr
(A3), using the fact that . ˆ ˆ k(v) ≤ h(v, b)
Fix a v. Then and satisﬁes constraints (15) and (16), w(v) p vu (v) p (1 b)v
so that the maximized value must be greater than k p v(1 b)C(v(1 
. Then, since the objective is nonpositive, we can restrict the ˆˆ b)) mbk(v)
maximization over so that . Since is concave with ˆ ˆˆ w(v) k(w(v)) ≥ k/[bp(v)] k(w(v))
the limits (A3), this deﬁnes a closed, bounded interval for for each w(v) v 
. Similarly, we can restrict the maximization over so that V u(v) vu(v)
. Since is strictly concave, with hC(u(v)) m ≥ k/p(v) vuhC(u) vuhC(u) r
 when either or , this deﬁnes a closed, bounded interval for u r  u r 
for each . Hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict the max- u(v) v  V
imization of the continuous objective function (A2) to a compact set, so that a
maximum must be attained.
If utility is bounded below, then and (by the same ar- ˆ lim k(v) p v 1  vrv —
gument as above) . Hence, the restrictions ˆ ˆˆ lim k(v) p  k(w(v)) ≥ k/[bp(v)] vrv ¯
and continue to deﬁne, given v, closed intervals vu(v)hC(u(v)) m ≥ k/p(v)
for and for each . Again, restricting the maximization in (A2), w(v) u(v) v  V
without loss of generality, within these intervals ensures that the maximum is
attained. QED
Lemma A2. The value function satisﬁes the Bellman equation (14)– k(v)
(16).
Proof. Suppose that for some v
ˆ k(v) 1 max[vu(v)hC(u(v)) bk(w(v))],
u,w
where the maximization is subject to (15) and (16). Then there exists such D 1 0
that
ˆ k(v) ≥ [vu(v)hC(u(v)) bk(w(v))] D
for all (u, w) that satisfy (15) and (16). But then by deﬁnition

tt t ˆ ˜˜ k(w(v)) ≥ b  [vu(v)hC(u(v))]  1 tt t
tp0
for all allocations that yield and are incentive compatible. Substituting, ˜ uw (v)
we ﬁnd that

tt t ˆ k(v) ≥ b  [vu(v)hC(u(v))] D  1 tt t
tp0
for all incentive-compatible allocations that deliver v, a contradiction with the
deﬁnition of ; namely, there should be a plan with value arbitrarily close to k(v)
. We conclude that k(v ) 0
ˆ k(v) ≤ max[vu(v)hC(u(v)) bk(w(v))]
u,w
subject to (15) and (16).390 journal of political economy
By deﬁnition, for every v and , there exists a plan that is
t ˜ e 1 0{ u(v; v, e)} t
incentive compatible and delivers v with value

tt t ˆ ˜˜ b  [vu(v; v, e)hC(u(v; v, e))] ≥ k(v)e.  1 tt t
tp0
Let
ˆ (u*(v), w*(v))  argmax[vu(v)hC(u(v)) bk(w(v))].
u,w
Consider the plan and for
t ˜ u (v ) p u*(v ) u(v) p u ((v ,… ,v); w*(v ), e) 00 0 tt 11 t 0
. Then t ≥ 1

tt t ˆ k(v) ≥ b  [vu(v)hC(u(v))]  1 tt t
tp0

tt 1 t1 ˆˆ p  v u*(v )hC(u*(v )) bb  [v u (v )hC(u (v ))]  10 0 0 0t1 t1 t1 []
tp0
ˆˆ ≥ max[vu(v)hC(u(v)) bk(w(v))] be.
u,w
Since was arbitrary, it follows that e 1 0 k(v) ≥ max [vu(v)hC(u(v))  u,w
subject to (15) and (16). QED ˆ bk(w(v))]
Proof of Theorem 2
We establish the following results from which the theorem follows: (a)A na l -
location is optimal for the component planning problem (13)withmultiplier {u } t
h, given , if and only if it is generated by the policy functions
uw v p v (g , g ) 0
starting at , is incentive compatible, and delivers welfare . (b) An allocation vv 0 0
generated by the policy functions , starting at , has
uw {u }( g , g ) v t 0
and delivers welfare . (c) An allocation generated
tt 1 lim b  [v(v )] p 0 v {u } tr 1 t 0 t
by the policy functions , starting from , is incentive compatible if
uw (g , g ) v0
tt 1 t1 limsup bv(j (v )) ≥ 0 1 t
tr
for all reporting strategies j.
Part a: Suppose that the allocation is generated by the policy functions {u } t
starting from , is incentive compatible, and delivers welfare . After repeated vv 0 0
substitutions of the Bellman equation (14), we arrive at
T
tt t T 1 T ˆˆ k(v ) p b  [vu(v)hC(u(v))] b  k(v (v )). (A 5)  0 1 tt t 1 T1
tp0
Since is bounded above, this implies that k(v ) 0

tt t ˆ k(v ) ≤ b  [vu(v)hC(u(v))],  0 1 tt t
tp0
so is optimal, by deﬁnition of . {u } k(v ) t 0
Conversely, suppose that an allocation is optimal given . Then by deﬁ- {u } v t 0inequality and social discounting 391
nition it must be incentive compatible and deliver welfare . Deﬁne the con- v0
tinuation welfare implicit in the allocation

t1 t w (v ) { b  [vu(v)],  00 0tt
tp1
and suppose that either or for some
uw u (v) ( g (v; v ) w (v) ( g (v; v ) v  00 00
. Since the original plan is incentive compatible, and satisfy V {u } u (v) w (v) t 00
(15) and (16). The Bellman equation then implies that
uu w k(v ) p [g (v; v )hC(g (v; v )) bk(g (v; v ))] 00 0 0
1 [u (v)hC(u (v)) bk(w (v))] 00 0

tt t ≥  [u (v )hC(u (v ))]  b  [u(v)hC(u(v))].  10 0 0 0 1 tt
tp1
The ﬁrst inequality follows since does not maximize (14); the second in- u0
equality follows the deﬁnition of . Thus the allocation cannot be k(w (v)) {u } 0 t
optimal, a contradiction. A similar argument applies if the plan is not generated
by the policy functions after some history and . We conclude that an
t v t ≥ 1
optimal allocation must be generated from the policy functions.
Part b: First, suppose that an allocation generated by the policyfunctions {u , v} tt
starting at satisﬁes . Then, after repeated sub-
uw t t 1 (g , g ) v lim b  v(v ) p 0 0 tr 1 t
stitutions of (15), we obtain
T
tt T 1 T v p b  [vu(v)] b  [v (v )]. (A 6)  0 1 tt 1 T1
tp0
Taking the limit, we get so that the allocation delivers
 tt v p b  [vu(v)] {u } 0 1 tt t tp0
welfare . Next, we show that for any allocation generated by starting
uw v (g , g ) 0
from , v0
tt 1 limb  v(v ) p 0. 1 t
tr
Suppose that utility is unbounded above and . Then
tt 1 limsup b  v(v ) 1 0 tr 1 t
implies that . Since the value function is
tt 1 ˆˆ b 1 b limsup b  v(v ) p  k(v) tr 1 t
nonconstant, is concave, and reaches an interior maximum, we can bound the
value function so that , with . Thus k(v) ≤ avba ! 0
tt 1 tt 1 ˆ ˆ liminfb  k(v(v )) ≤ a limsupb  v(v )b p , 1 t 1 t
tr tr
and then (A5) implies that , a contradiction since there are feasible k(v ) p  0
plans that yield ﬁnite values. We conclude that .
tt 1 limsup b  v(v ) ≤ 0 tr 1 t
Similarly, suppose that utility is unbounded below and that
. Since , this implies that
tt 1 tt 1 ˆˆ liminf b  v(v ) ! 0 b 1 b liminf b  v(v ) p tr 1 t tr 1 t
. Using , with , we conclude that  k(v) ≤ avba 1 0
tt 1 ˆ liminfb  k(v(v )) p , 1 t
tr392 journal of political economy
implying , a contradiction. Thus we must have k(v ) p  0
.
tt 1 liminf b  v(v ) ≥ 0 tr 1 t
The two established inequalities imply that .
tt 1 lim b  v(v ) p 0 tr 1 t
Part c: Suppose that for every reportingstrategy
tt 1 t1 limsup b  v(j (v )) ≥ 0 tr 1 t
j. Then after repeated substitutions of (16),
T
tt t T 1 TT v ≥ b  [vu(j(v))] b  [v (j (v ))],  0 1 tt 1 T1
tp0
implying
T
tt t v ≥ liminf b  [vu(j(v))].  0 1 tt
tp0 Tr
Therefore, is incentive compatible, since is attainable with truth-telling {u } v t 0
from part b.
Proof of Proposition 1
Strict concavity.—Let be generated from the policy func-
tt 1 {u(v, v ), v(v , v )} t 0 t 0
tions starting at (note that no claim of incentive compatibility is required). v0
Take two initial welfare values and , with . Deﬁne the average utilities vv v ( v ab a b
a tt t u (v) { au(v, v )(1 a)u(v, v ), tt a t b
a tt t v (v) { av(v; v )(1 a)v(v; v ). tt a t b
As shown in the proof of theorem 2, and deliver welfare
tt {u(v, v )} {u(v, v )} ta tb
and , respectively. This implies that delivers welfare
a t a vv {u (v)} v { av  ab t a
. It also implies that (1 a)vb
tt u(v; v ) ( u(v; v ), (A7) ta tb
for some history . Consider iterating T times on the Bellman equations
tt 1 v  V
starting from and : vv ab
T
tt t T 1 T ˆˆ k(v ) p b  [vu(v; v )hC(u(v; v ))] b  k(v (v ; v ))  a 1 tt a t a 1 T1 a
tp0
and
T
tt t T 1 T ˆˆ k(v ) p b  [vu(v; v )hC(u(v; v ))] b  k(v (v ; v )),  b 1 tt b t b 1 T1 b
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and averaging we obtain for large enough T
ak(v )(1 a)k(v ) ab
T
t a tt t ˆ p b  [vu (v)h[aC(u(v; v )) (1 a)C(u(v; v ))]]  1 tt t a t b
tp0
T1 TT ˆ b  [ak(v (v ; v )) (1 a)k(v (v ; v ))] 1 T1 aT 1 b
T
t a t a tT 1 a T a ˆˆ ! b  [vu (v)hC(u (v))] b  k(v (v )) ≤ k(v ),  1 tt t 1 T1
tp0
where the strict inequality follows from the strict concavity of the cost function
, the fact that we have the inequality (A7), and the weak concavity of the C(u)
value function k. The last weak inequality follows from iterating on the Bellman
equation for since the average plan ( , ) satisﬁes the constraints of the
aa a vu v
Bellman equation at every step. This proves that the value function is strictly k(v)
concave.
Differentiability.—Since is concave, it is subdifferentiable: there is at least k(v)
one subgradient at every v. We establish differentiability by proving that there
is a unique subgradient by variational envelope arguments.
Suppose ﬁrst that utility is unbounded below. Fix an interior value . In a v0
neighborhood of deﬁne the test function v0
uuw ˆ W(v) { [v[g (v, v )(vv )] hC(g (v, v )(vv )) bk(g (v, v ))]. 00 00 0
Since is the value of a feasible allocation in the neighborhood of , it W(v) v0
follows that , with equality at . Since exists, it follows, by
  W(v) ≤ k(v) vW (v ) 00
application of the Benveniste-Scheinkman theorem (see Stokey and Lucas 1989,
theorem 4.10), that also exists and
  k (v ) 0
     k (v ) p W (v ) p 1h[C (u*(v))]. (A8) 00
Finally, since , this shows that . The limit is
     C (u) ≥ 0 k (v) ≤ 1 lim k (v) p 1 vr
inherited by the upper bound introduced in the proof ˆ k(v) ≤ h(v, b)m/(1 b)
of theorem 1, since . lim h(v, b)/v p 1 vr
The limit follows immediately from if
  ¯ lim k (v) p  lim k(v) p  v! vrv ¯v rv ¯
. Otherwise it is inherited by the upper bound in- ˆ  k(v) ≤ h(v, b)m/(1 b)
troduced in the proof of theorem 1, since . lim h(v, b)/v p  vr
Next, suppose that utility is bounded below but unbounded above. With-
out loss of generality, we normalize so that . Then U(0) p 0
for all reporting strategies j so that, when we
tt 1 t1 limsup  bv(j (v )) ≥ 0 tr 1 t
apply theorem 2, a solution to the planner’s sequence problem is ensured. {u } t
Then, for any interior , the plan is incentive compatible and attains v {(v/v )u } 00 t
value v for the agent. In addition, the test function
 vv tt t ˆ W(v) { b  v u(v)hCu (v)  1 tt t () [] vv tp0 00
satisﬁes , and is differentiable. It follows from the W(v) ≤ k(v) W(v ) p k(v ) 00
Benveniste-Scheinkman theorem that exists and equals .
   k (v ) W (v ) 00
The proof of isthe same as inthecasewithutilityunbounded
  lim k (v) p  vrv ¯394 journal of political economy
below. Finally, we show that . Consider the deterministicplanning
  lim k (v) p  vrv —
problem

t ˆ k(v) { max b[u hC(u )]  tt
tp0 u
subject to . Note that is differentiable with .Since
 t   v p buk (v) lim k (v) p  tv rv tp0 —
deterministic plans are trivially incentive compatible, it follows that , k(v) ≤ k(v)
with equality at . Then we must have to avoid a contradiction.
  v lim k (v) p  vrv —
If utility is bounded above and unbounded below, then a symmetricargument,
normalizing utility of inﬁnite consumption to zero, also works. If utility is
bounded above and below, we can generate a test function that combines both
arguments, one for and another for . v ! vv ≥ v 00
Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst show that we can simplify problem (14)–(16). Let V p {v , v ,… ,v } 12 N
with . The incentive compatibility constraint (16) is … v p v ! v !! v p v 12 N
equivalent to the subset that considers only neighboring deviations:
v u(v )bw(v ) ≥ v u(v )bw(v ), n p 1, 2, …, N1, (A9) nn n nn 1 n1
and
v u(v )bw(v ) ≥ v u(v )bw(v ), n p 2, 3, …, N. (A10) nn n nn 1 n1
These imply that is nondecreasing and that is nonincreasing. u(v) w(v)
Now, consider a simpliﬁed version of the problem (14)–(16) that replaces
(16) with (A9) and the monotonicity constraint that be nondecreasing (ig- u(v)
noring the constraints [A10]). We show next that at the solutiontothissimpliﬁed
problem, all the inequalities (A9) hold with equality. This, in turn, implies that
the constraints (A10) are satisﬁed. As a result, the solution to this simpliﬁed
problem is also a solution to problem (14)–(16).
That the constraints (A9) hold with equality at a solution to the simpliﬁed
problem is proved by contradiction. Suppose that, for some , n p 1, 2, …
, (A9) is slack: K1
v u(v )bw(v ) 1 v u(v )bw(v ). (A11) nn n nn 1 n1
This implies, from the monotonicity constraint, that and u(v ) 1 u(v ) n1 n
. Now consider the alternative allocation that changes only w(v ) ! w(v ) n1 n
and : decreasing and increasing , while keeping the w(v ) w(v ) w(v ) w(v ) nn 1 nn 1
average constant. Such a change does not affect the w(v )p(v )w(v )p(v ) n1 n1 nn
promise-keeping constraint (15). Increasing relaxes the incentive con- w(v ) n1
straint (A9) for , whereas lowering is feasible because of the strict n1 w(v ) n
inequality (A11). Thus a small change in this direction is feasible. However,since
is strictly concave in w (proposition 1), this change increases the objective k(w)
(14), a contradiction with optimality. Thus, at an optimum, the constraints (A9)
hold with equality.
The arguments above justify focusing on the simpliﬁed problem that maxi-
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(with multiplier ) for . The ﬁrst-order condi- u(v ) ≤ u(v ) c n p 1, …, N1 n1 nn
tions are
  u p(v )[v hC (g (v , v)) lv ]vmvmc c ≤ 0, nn n n n n n 1 n1 nn 1
  w ˆ p(v )[bk (g (v , v)) bl]b(m m ) p 0 nn n n 1
for , where , and we adopt the convention n p 1, 2, …, N m p m p c p c p 0 0 N 0 N
that . v p v 01
Consider ﬁrst the case in which utility is unbounded below, so that thesolution
for is interior. Summing the ﬁrst-order conditions for over all , u(v) u(v) v  V
we get
  u   h C (g (v, v))p(v) p 1k (v) 
vV
since by the envelope condition.
  l p k (v)
Now take the set of all agents that receive the same allocation n p 1, …, m
as the agent with the lowest shock ; then . Then summing the ﬁrst-order vc p 0 m —
conditions for over implies u(v ) n p 1, …, m n
vm mm    u   u —— [vFv ≤ v ][1 k (v)]  p hC (g (v, v)) ≤ h C (g (v, v))p(v)  m — Pr(v ≤ v ) vV m —
  p 1k (v), (A12)
where the inequality follows by . Summing the ﬁrst-order con-
uu g (v, v) ≤ g (v, v)
ditions for over , we get w(v ) n p 1, …, m n
ˆˆ mb b m    w    w — p k (v) k (g (v, v)) ≥ k (v) k (g (v, v)),
Pr(v ≤ v ) bb m —
where the inequality follows by . Combining both inequalities
ww g (v, v) ≥ g (v, v)
gives
bv 1[vFv ≤ v ] b mm   w   —— 1k (g (v, v)) ≤ [1 k (v)] 1 . (A13) ˆ ˆ v bb m —
Symmetrically, take the set of all agents receiving the same n p m,… ,N
allocations as the agent with the highest taste shock ; then . Then adding vc p 0 m
up their ﬁrst-order condition gives
m v m1 m1    u   u [vFv ≥ v ][1 k (v)]  p hC (g (v, v)) ≥ h C (g (v, v))p(v)  m — ) vV Pr(v ≥ vm
  p 1k (v), (A14)
ˆˆ m bb m1    w    w  p k (v) k (g (v, v)) ≤ k (v) k (g (v, v)),
) bb Pr(v ≥ vm396 journal of political economy
where the inequality arises from and . Com-
uu ww g (v, v) ≥ g (v, v) g (v, v) ≤ g (v, v)
bining both inequalities gives
1[vFv ≥ v v bb m m1 ]    w [1 k (v)] 1 ≤ 1k (g (v, v)). (A15) ˆˆ bb vm1
To arrive at expression (21) take the that maximizes the right-hand side of m
(A13) and that minimizes the left-hand side of (A15) to deﬁne m
bv 1[vFv ≥ v ] n1 n g { min ˆ v 1≤n≤N b n1
and
bv 1[vFv ≤ v ] nn g { max ˆ v 1≤n≤N b n
(recall the convention that ). Note that and that ˆ v p vg ≤ b/b ≤ gg ≥ 01
and . It follows that in the limit as ˆˆ (b/b)(v1v/v)/vg ≤ (b/b)(v1v/v)/v
(which requires both and given that ), we get v/v r 1 v r 1 v r 1 [v] p 1 g r
and . ˆˆ b/bg r b/b
In the bounded utility case the arguments are similar, but we need to consider
the possibility that consumption is zero. First, take the case in which l p
. As before, let be the set of all agents who receive the
  k (v) 1 1 n p 1, …, m
same allocation as the agent with the lowest taste shock . Then adding up the v
ﬁrst-order conditions for for and evaluating it at u(v) n p 1, …, mu (v) p
(so that ) requires
  U(0) C (u(v)) p 0
m
  [1 k (v)] v p(v )vm ≤ 0,  nn m m —— np1
a contradiction, since the left-hand side is strictly positive: and
  1k (v) 1 0
. Thus, for consumption is strictly positive and the same argument
  m ≥ 0 k (v) ! 1 m —
used in the unbounded utility case applies to derive the bounds.
Next, consider the case in which . As before, let
  l p k (v) ≥ 1 n p m,… ,N
denote the set of all agents who receive the same allocation as the agent with
the highest taste shock . Then adding up the ﬁrst-order conditions for for v u(v)
, we ﬁnd that an interior solution would require n p m,… ,N
N
   u [1 k (v)hC (g (v, v))] v p(v )vmp 0,  nn m 1 m1 —— npm
which is not possible since the left-hand side is strictly negative. Thus, for
consumption must be zero: and
  uw k (v) ≥ 1 g (v, v) p U(0) g (v, v) p [v
for all . U(0)]/b 1 v v  Vinequality and social discounting 397
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider ﬁrst the case with utility unbounded below. Since the derivative
  k (v)
is continuous and strictly decreasing, we can deﬁne the transition function
  w   1 Q(x, v) p k (g ((k )( x), v))
for all if utility is unbounded below. For any probability measure m,l e t x ! 1
be the probability measure deﬁned by T (m) Q
T (m)(A) p 1 dm(x)dp(v) Q  {Q(x,v)A}
for any Borel set A. Deﬁne
2 n … T T  T QQ Q
T { . Q,n n
For example, is the empirical average of over all histories of
  n T (d ){ k (v)} Q,nx tt p1
length n starting with . The following lemma establishes the existence
  k (v ) p x 0
of an invariant distribution by comparing the limits of . {T } Q,n
Lemma A3. If utility is unbounded below, then for any there exists a x ! 1
subsequence of distributions that converges weakly (i.e., in distribu- {T (d )} Q,f(n) x
tion) to an invariant distribution under Q on (, 1).
Proof. The bounds (21) derived in proposition 2 imply that, for all , v  V
b   w limQ(x, v) p limk (g (v, v)) p ! 1. ˆ
xF1 vr b
We ﬁrst extend the continuous transition function Q(x, v):( ,1 ) #V r
to a continuous transition function with ˆ (,1 ) Q(x, v):( ,1 )#V r (,1 )
and , for all . It follows that maps ˆ ˆˆ Q(1, v) p b/b Q(x, v) p Q(x, v) x  (,1 ) Tˆ Q
probability measures over (, 1] to probability measures over (, 1), and
for all . T (d ) p T (d ) x  (,1 ) ˆ Qx Qx
We next show that the sequence is tight in that for any there {T (d )} e 1 0 ˆ Q,nx
exists a compact set such that for all n. The expected value AT (d )[A ] ≥ 1e ˆ e Q,nx e
of the distribution is simply with . Recall
n   t1   T (d )  [k (v(v ))] x p k (v ) ! 1 ˆ Qx 1 t 0
that . This implies that
  t1 t   ˆ  [k (v(v ))] p (b/b)k (v ) r 0 1 t 0
   t1 n min{0, k (v )} ≤  [k (v(v ))] ≤ T (d )[(, A)](A) ˆ 0 1 tx Q
n {1T (d )[(, A)]}1 ˆ x Q
for all . Rearranging, we get A 1 0
1min{0, x} n T (d )[(, A)] ≤ , ˆ x Q A1
which implies that , and therefore , is tight.
n {T (d )} {T (d )} ˆˆ Qx Q ,nx
Tightness implies that there exists a subsequence that converges T (d ) ˆ Q,f(n) x
weakly, that is, in distribution, to some probability measure p. Since is ˆ Q(x, v)398 journal of political economy
continuous in x, converges weakly to . But the linearity of T (T (d )) T (p) ˆˆ ˆ QQ ,f(n) xQ
implies that Tˆ Q
f(n)1 T (d )T (d ) ˆˆ Qx Q x
T (T (d )) p T (d ), ˆˆ ˆ QQ ,f(n) xQ ,f(n) x f(n)
and since , we must have . f(n) r  T (p) p p ˆ Q
Recall that maps probability measures over (, 1] to probabilitymeasures Tˆ Q
over (, 1). This implies that has no probability mass at {1}. Since p p T (p) ˆ Q
and coincide for such probability measures, it follows that , so TT p p T (p) ˆ QQ Q
that p is an invariant measure under Q on (, 1). QED
The argument for the case with utility bounded below is very similar. Deﬁne
the transition function as above, but for all , since now can
  Q(x, v) x   k (v)
take on any real value. If utility is unbounded above but , then there exists g ! 1
an upper bound for the ergodic set for v. Deﬁne the welfare level ¯ v !vv 1 H 0
by and let be the minimum of over ; this
  w vk (v ) p 1 vg (v, v) v  [v , v ] 0 L 0 H
minimum is attained since is continuous. If utility is bounded above, then
w g
let be the minimum of over ; this minimum is attained since
w ¯ vg v  [v , v) L 0
. In both cases, since , we must have that . Finally,
ww ¯ lim g (v, v) pvg 1 vv 1 v vrv ¯ L
the transition function is continuous with . The rest of the
  Q(x, v) ≤ k (v ) !  L
argument is then a straightforward modiﬁcation of the one spelled out for the
case with utility unbounded below, except that plays the role of 1. Indeed,
  k (v ) L
things are slightly simpler here since we do not need to construct an extension
of Q.
If , then the bound in (21) implies that , and the
  w ˆ g 1 0 k (g (v, v)) ≤ 1(b/b)
result follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider indexing the relaxed planning problem by e and setting for
1 h p e
the associated component planning problem, with associated value function
. We ﬁrst show that if an initial distribution w satisﬁes the condition k(v; e)
, then it is a solution to the relaxed and original socialplanning
  k (v; e)dw(v) p 0 ∫
problems. We then show that for any initial distribution there exists a value for
e that satisﬁes .
  k (v; e)dw(v) p 0 ∫
Since utility is unbounded below, we have . Ap-
   vt k (v; e) p  [1 hC (u (v))] tt 1 t
plying the law of iterated expectations to (19) then yields
t b   vt    [1 hC (u (v))] p k (v; e). 1 t () ˆ b
With logarithmic utility, , so that implies
   C (u) p C(u) k (v; e)dw(v) p 0 ∫
v 1  [C(u )]dw(v) p h p e for all t p 0, 1, ….  1 t
That the limiting condition (17) is satisﬁed is shown in proposition 5. It then
follows that allocations generated this way solve the relaxed and original social
planning problems with .
1 e p h
Now consider any initial distribution w. We argue that we can ﬁnd a value ofinequality and social discounting 399
such that . The homogeneity of the sequential problem
1   h p ek (v; e)dw(v) p 0 ∫
implies that
11
k(v; e) p log(e)kv  log(e); 1 . () ˆ 1b 1b
Note that
1   kv  log(e); 1 () 1b
is strictly increasing in e and limits to one as and to  as . It e r  e r 
follows that
1    k (v; e)dw(v) p kv  log(e); 1 dw(v) p 0  () 1b
deﬁnes a unique value of for any initial distribution w. The monotonicity of ˆ e
then follows immediately by using the fact that is a strictly decreasing
  ˆ e(w) k ( 7;1 )
function.
Proof of Proposition 5
Part a: Suppose that is bounded above and unbounded below (part b deals U(c)
with the bounded below case); normalize so that so that . ¯ lim U(c) p 0 v p 0 cr
Proposition 2 then implies that as . Moreover, note
  w ˆ k (g (v, v)) r b/b v r 
that, since u is nonpositive, for all v, implying that
w   w g (v, v) ≥ v/b lim k (g (v, vrv ¯
. Given these limits and the fact that is continuous on
  w v)) p  k (g (v, 7))
, it follows that , so there exists a such
  w ¯ (, v) sup k (g (v, v)) ! 1 v 1  v(,v ¯) L
that for all v. Hence, the sequence generated by the policy functions
w g (v, v) 1 vL
satisﬁes for , implying the limiting condition in theorem 2.
t1 v(v ) ≥ vt ≥ 1 tL
Part b: If utility is bounded below, then is bounded below and the
t1 v(v ) t
result follows immediately since the limiting condition (17) in theorem 2 holds.
Part c: Using the optimality conditions (A12) and (A14) from the proof of
proposition 2, one can show that
  u C (g (v, v)) v
≤ .   u C (g (v, v)) v
With logarithmic utility, this implies that . The in-
uu g (v, v)g (v, v) ≤ log(v/v)
centive constraint then implies that . It
ww g (v, v)g (v, v) ≤ (v/b)log(v/v) { A
follows that for all pairs of histories and . Then
t1 t1 t1 t1 ˆ ˆ v(v ) ≥ v(v )tA vv tt
tt 1 t1 tt 1 t b  [v(j (v ))] ≥ b  [v(v )] btA. 1 t 1 t
In the proof of theorem 2 we established that . Since
tt 1 lim b  [v(v )] p 0 tr 1 t
, it follows that .
tt t 1 t1 lim btAp 0 limsup b  [v(j (v ))] ≥ 0 tr tr 1 t
Part d: If , then the bound in (21) implies that and
  w ˆ g 1 0 k (g (v, v)) ≤ 1b/b
the result follows immediately. If , then we can deﬁne g ! 1 k p 1[(1 
and deﬁne by . Then for all we have
  w ˆ b/b)/(1 g)] vk (v ) p k v ≤ vg (v, HH H
. It follows that the unique ergodic set is bounded above by . We can v) ≤ vv H400 journal of political economy
now apply the argument in part a so there exists a such that
w v 1  g (v, L
. v) 1 vL
Proof of Proposition 6
For part a, recall that under the invariant distribution . If
  k (v)dw*(v) p 0 w* ∫
utility is unbounded below, then all solutions for consumption are interior. For
interior solutions,
   uu 1k (v) p h C (g (v, v))p(v) p h G(C(g (v, v)))p(v), 
vVv V
where . Since G(c) is convex for , there must exist
   ¯ G(c) { C (U(c)) p 1/U (c) c ≥c
scalars A, B with such that for all c. For example, set A 1 0 G(c) ≥ AcBA p
and . Then
   ¯¯ ¯ G (c) B p G (c)c
1 uu p G(C(g (v, v)))p(v)dw*(v) ≥ AC (g (v, v))p(v)dw*(v)B,   h vVv V
and the result follows.
If utility is bounded below, by proposition 2, corner solutions
u C(g (v, v)) p
occur for where . For , solutions are interior
  0 v ≤ v ≤ v* k (v*) p 1 v 1 v*
for all , and the argument above applies. This establishes
u C(g (v, v)) 1 0 v  V
that total consumption is ﬁnite.
For part b note that implies that the ergodic set for welfare v is bounded g ! 1
away from . Then the continuity of the policy function implies that
u ¯ vg (v, v)
consumption is bounded by some ﬁnite number on the support of
u C(g (v, v))
. Total consumption is then ﬁnite. w*
Proof of Proposition 7
Let denote the maximum value attained for the relaxed planning prob-
R S (w; e)
lem with , distribution w, and endowment e. Note that
t ˆ Q p b t
R S(w; e) ≤ S (w; e),
with equality at steady-state distributions . Since ˆ w* k(v; h)dw(v)[he/(1 b)] ∫
represents the full Lagrangian function (which now includes the omitted term
due to e in [12]), by duality (see Luenberger 1969, chap. 8.6),
e R S (w; e) vdw(v) ≤ k(v; h)dw(v)h  vdw(v),   ˆ 1b
with equality whenever w, h, and e are such that at the allocation that attains
the intertemporal resource constraint (11) holds, which is true at the k(v, h)
constructed steady state. Integrating the right-hand side by parts gives
e R   S (w; e) vdw(v) ≤ [1w(v)][k (v; h)1]dvh .  ˆ 1binequality and social discounting 401
It follows that
S(w; e) vdw(v) S(w*; e) vdw*(v)  []
RR ≤ S (w; e) vdw(v) S (w*; e) vdw*(v)  []
  ≤ [w*(v)w(v)][k (v; h)1]dv. 
If on the support of , then the last term is strictly negative for all
  k (v; h) ! 1 w*
w with for all v. Thus maximizes subject to w(v) ! w*(v) w* S(w; e)∫ vdw(v)
for all v. Proposition 1 implies that if utility is unbounded
  w(v) ≤ w*(v) k (v; h) ! 1
below, in which case consumption is strictly positive. By proposition 2, when
utility is bounded, for a positive measure of agents under if and
  k (v; h) ≥ 1 w*
only if consumption is zero for a positive measure of agents under . w*
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